Mitigating violence by solving the commitment problem in post

Why do some political groups choose to remain militant when they have the opportunity to transform into political parties or become members of state organs? By scrutinizing the power-sharing negotiations held before a country’s first election, this article argues that the group that leads the negotiations faces the challenge of accepting or declining the policy proposed by its counterpart who poses a threat of violence. Even if the counterpart proposes policy that is acceptable to the leading faction, fulfilling the commitment in regard to the political deal is another challenge for the leading faction. Such challenges often fail and consequently cause violence. In contrast, some counterparts can successfully transform themselves into non-violent political agencies regardless of whether they make compromises in policies or not. Third parties can play a vital role in avoiding violence by influencing actors’ decision-making or enhancing the leading faction’s ability to achieve its commitment. The article illustrates this argument by presenting a formal model and then testing the model by examining the case of Timor-Leste. It suggests specific conditions required for negotiations under which armed groups transform into peaceful actors when introduction of democracy and state-building are ongoing