Evergreening of pharmaceutical patents: A blithe disregard for the rationale of the patent system

Evergreening of pharmaceutical patents has emerged as a serious challenge for access to affordable drugs as it aims to delay the generic competition by extending the length of the exclusivity period beyond the legitimate patent term without any considerable improvement in therapeutic benefits of the already patented pharmaceutical drug. This paper endeavours to question the legitimacy of the evergreening of pharmaceutical patents. This study applies all the recognized theories in support of the patent system – namely the ‘natural law’ or ‘natural rights’ theory, the ‘reward by monopoly’ theory, the ‘monopoly-profit incentive’ theory, the ‘exchange for secrets’ theory or the ‘contract’ theory, and the ‘prospect’ theory – to the practice of evergreening of drug patents in order to check whether or not any of these theories can be used to justify the practice. The study concludes that the practice of evergreening is not consistent with any of these theories and therefore lacks any plausible justification