The Turkish Military in Politics, and the Attempted Coup of 15-16 July 2016

A few months after he returned to office in November 1991, Turkey’s then Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel confidently predicted that the era of military coups in Turkey was over: ‘[F]or the time being’, he opined, ‘neither the atmosphere of Turkey nor the atmosphere of the world is suitable for a coup d’état’ (Evans, 1992, p. 106). Demirel’s prediction turned out to be too optimistic, but it has to be said in his defence that very few of the many observers of Turkish politics had expected the traumatic events of the night of 15-16 July 2016. The AKP government appeared to have made its peace with the generals, while President Erdo？an, in spite of his quest for personal autocracy, retained substantial public support. Hence, for most of us, the attempted takeover came like a bolt from the blue, and still requires explanation. It also offered important comparisons with previous coups in Turkey, both successful and unsuccessful, as well as with global trends. In an attempt to address these issues this paper starts by summarising some general theory on the nature of coups, as suggested in the academic literature. This is followed by an outline of Turkey’s experiences with military interventions since 1960. The next two sections, respectively, relate the events of 15-16 July, as nearly as we currently know them, and try to offer explanations for the failure of the coup. The final section addresses some critical remaining questions, and speculates whether Süleyman Demirel’s prediction has, at long last, been achieved