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Can Value-Pluralism Be Compatible with Perfectionism? An Assessment of J. Raz’s Liberal Effort to Combine Them

DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2023.131005, PP. 67-87

Keywords: Liberalism, Perfectionism, Raz Joseph, Value-Pluralism

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Abstract:

Raz’s robust perfectionist arguments follow a logical sequence permeating not only his overall liberal stance but also his position on value-pluralism. By situating a comprehensive understanding of value-pluralism and by highlighting its divergence from relativism and the prevalent in liberal theory neutralist strand, the present text aims to reinforce the coherency of perfectionist arguments and their compatibility with liberalism. Notwithstanding the noted imperfections of Raz’s incommensurability, the current article’s exposition of his liberal thought as following a logical sequence to convey its perfectionism implicitly answers to neutralists construing the latter as simply lumping heterogeneous elements from diverse traditions. Raz’s present interpretation, enriching where necessary his arguments in order to support a complex notion of value-pluralism, could ideally contribute to the strengthening of the currently marginal and underrated expression of liberalism in perfectionist terms.

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