Territories change hands with wars or faits
accomplis (land grabs). A fait accompli does not directly aim at war; instead,
it is mainly used to exert pressure against the adversary and demand compensation.
However, a fait accompli can lead to open warfare. Other faits accomplis bring
permanent changes, and others temporary ones. Regarding the efficiency of faits
accomplis, we examine two seemingly different cases, the case of Varosha, a
town in Cyprus, and the case of the region of Crimea in Ukraine. Nevertheless,
in both cases, the faits accomplis are linked to long-term broader conflicts. A
detailed presentation of these cases allows a conclusion about the substance
and efficiency of this strategy.
References
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