We incorporate the deposit insurance system into the analysis framework of the impact of bank information disclosure on their risk-taking, and empirically test the impact and synergistic effect of deposit insurance system and bank information disclosure on their risk-taking using the data of 266 Chinese commercial banks from 2007 to 2019. We find that the improvement of bank information disclosure will reduce bank risk taking, and the implementation of deposit insurance system will help reduce bank risk taking. The implementation of deposit insurance system and the improvement of bank information disclosure can not only inhibit the bank’s risk taking, but also play a synergistic role in reducing bank’s risk taking. Several extensions for future research are also offered.
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