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Consequences of Securitization Process on Internal and External Levels in Türkiye (2011-2022)

DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2023.134027, PP. 453-475

Keywords: Securitization, Foreign Policy, Existential Threat, Emergency Action, Polarization

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Abstract:

This article critically examines the repercussions of securitization within the Turkish political system, analysing its implications at both domestic and regional dimensions. It focuses on the domestic level as one of several factors that have exacerbated the polarization of society and negatively affected Türkiye’s normative foreign policy. The article adopted the components of the securitization process as the theoretical framework, with its three aspects: existential threats, emergency actions, and breaking free of rules, as demonstrated in “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” book. The article concluded that vulnerabilities represented in the decline of democracy led to the loss of the political system’s popularity and the prevalence of a state of polarization in its two parts: elite and masses. Authoritarian tendencies have also eroded the barriers between domestic and foreign policy. Indeed, the foreign policy reflected the ruler’s perceptions away from institutionalization and bureaucracy. The traditional centers of power lost their pivotal role in foreign policy, and new institutions took over traditional authorities’ functions under the executive branch’s direct leadership. This shift enabled the ruling regime to engage in the Middle Eastern conflict zones in keeping with their tendency to feel proud and grandiose.

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