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“掏空”视角下控股股东股权质押经济后果——以A企业为例
The Economic Consequences of Controlling Shareholders’ Equity Pledges under the Perspective of “Hollowing Out”—Taking Enterprise A as an Example

DOI: 10.12677/MM.2024.141014, PP. 90-98

Keywords: 股权质押,掏空视角,财务绩效,风险研究,因子分析法
Equity Pledge
, Hollowing out Perspective, Financial Performance, Risk Study, Factor Analysis Method

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Abstract:

股权质押可在不改变股权结构的情况下快速获得资金,降低资本成本,但也存在市场风险,道德风险,财务风险等问题。本文基于“掏空”视角,采用因子分析法、Z与F计分模型对A企业2016~2022年财务绩效进行深入研究,结果发现:随着股权质押频次增加和质押率上升,控股股东可能会采取更为激进的经营决策,以追求短期利益,牺牲企业长期发展,加剧企业财务风险。本文揭示了股权质押的经济后果,为企业内部规避质押风险,外部强化监管提供一定的参考。
Equity pledge can obtain funds quickly without changing the equity structure and reduce the cost of capital, but it also has market risk, moral risk, financial risk and other problems. Based on the perspective of “hollowing out”, this paper adopts factor analysis and Z and F scoring model to conduct an in-depth study on the financial performance of Enterprise A from 2016 to 2022, and finds that: with the increase in the frequency of equity pledge and the increase in pledge rate, the controlling shareholders may take more aggressive business decisions to pursue short-term interests at the expense of long-term enterprise development, and aggravate the financial risk of the enterprise. The results show that with the increase of equity pledge frequency and pledge rate, controlling shareholders may take more aggressive business decisions to pursue short-term interests at the expense of long-term corporate development and aggravate corporate financial risks. This paper reveals the economic consequences of equity pledges, and provides certain references for enterprises to avoid pledge risks internally and strengthen supervision externally.

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