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从“知觉”角度探析梅洛–庞蒂对经验论和唯理论的批判
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Abstract:
梅洛–庞蒂认为,经验论和唯理论都没有真正理解知觉的原初意义,即知觉是作为一种人与世界的原初关联活动。基于此,梅洛–庞蒂采取了与传统认识论所不一样的方式去构建其知觉理论框架,他提出知觉在先、现象在先,以身体–主体作为一种媒介,强调了知觉的首要地位。梅洛–庞蒂对于经验论和唯理论知觉观的批判,其目的是力图重返现象世界,也就是回归到物自身上来,以此超越经验论和唯理论知觉观。
In Merleau-Ponty’s opinion, empiricism and rationalism neither really understand the original meaning of perception, that is, perception is the original connection between man and the world. Here, Merleau-Ponty adopts a different way from the traditional epistemology to construct the theoretical framework of perception. He puts forward that perception comes first and phenomenon comes first, and takes body-subject as a medium to emphasize the primacy of perception. Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of empiricism and rationalism is aimed at returning to the phenomenal world, that is, to the thing itself, so as to surpass empiricism and rationalism.
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