High-quality development is the primary task of China’s comprehensive construction of a modern socialist country,
and the high-quality development of corporates is the micro foundation of the
country’s high-quality development.
Based on the panel data of A-share listed companies in China from 2010 to 2020,
the relationship between the executive pay gap and the high-quality development of enterprises is
examined. The findings show that the executive pay gap significantly promotes
the high-quality corporate development, the influence mechanism is to improve
the level of green innovation of enterprises, and the equity concentration
negatively regulates the promotion effect of the executive pay gap on the
high-quality corporate development. Analyzed by the nature of property rights,
the executive pay gap has a greater effect on promoting the level of green
innovation and high-quality development
of non-state enterprises. The moderating effect of equity concentration is
significantly negative in state-owned enterprises and significantly positive in non-state-owned enterprises.
Therefore, in order to promote the high-quality
corporate development, we should appropriately increase the executive pay gap,
set a reasonable degree of equity concentration, strengthen the supervision of
executive behavior, and enhance the level of green innovation.
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