全部 标题 作者
关键词 摘要

OALib Journal期刊
ISSN: 2333-9721
费用:99美元

查看量下载量

相关文章

更多...

论胡塞尔现象学中纵意向性在意向结构中的奠基地位及意义——从超越对象的构造谈起
On the Founding Position and Significance of Vertical Intentionality in Intention Structure in Husserl’s Phenomenology—Starting from the Constitution of the Transcendent Object

DOI: 10.12677/ACPP.2024.131033, PP. 213-221

Keywords: 现象学,时间意识,纵意向性,意向结构
Phenomenology
, Time-Consciousness, Vertical Intentionality, Intention Structure

Full-Text   Cite this paper   Add to My Lib

Abstract:

在胡塞尔的现象学中,其讨论的对象具有着某种“超越性”,即意识认识的对象往往不仅仅局限于意识所感知到的实项材料的简单相加,而是以完整的形式呈现出来,是超越于实项材料的,且其超越性更突出地体现在它的时间性上。而对象的超越性来源于对象的构造——即意识的意向结构,意向结构则分为横、纵意向性两方面。本文正沿着此脉络,指出正是意向结构中的纵意向性(时间意识),主导了对象及其超越性的构成,从而证明其在意向结构中的奠基地位。
In Husserl’s phenomenology, the object discussed has some kinds of “transcendence”, namely it happens frequently that the object of conscious knowledge is not limited to the simple addition of the real material perceived by consciousness, but presented in a complete form, which is beyond the real containment. In this case, the transcendence of object is more prominently reflected in its temporal being. Furthermore, this kind of transcendence comes from the constitution of the object, referring back to the intention structure of consciousness, and the intention structure is divided into two aspects: Horizontal and vertical intentionality. Along this context, this paper points out that it is the vertical intentionality (time-consciousness) in the intention structure that dominates the constitution of the object and its transcendence, so as to prove its founding position in the intention structure.

References

[1]  [德]胡塞尔. 现象学的观念(五篇讲座稿) [M]. 倪梁康, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 2017.
[2]  [德]胡塞尔. 纯粹现象学通论[M]. [荷]舒曼, 编. 李幼燕, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 1992.
[3]  [德]胡塞尔. 笛卡尔式的沉思[M]. 张延国, 译. 北京: 中国城市出版社, 2002.
[4]  [德]胡塞尔. 被动综合分析: 1918-1926年讲座稿和研究稿[M]. 李云飞, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 2017.
[5]  倪梁康. 胡塞尔早期内时间意识分析的基本进路[J]. 中山大学学报(社会科学版), 2008(1): 102-111+205
[6]  [德]胡塞尔. 内时间意识现象学[M]. 倪梁康, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 2017.
[7]  [德]康德. 纯粹理性批判[M]. 蓝公武, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 1997.
[8]  [法]萨特. 存在与虚无[M]. 陈宜良, 等, 译. 北京: 生活?读书?新知三联书店, 1987.
[9]  [德]海德格尔. 存在与时间[M]. 陈嘉映, 王庆节, 译. 北京: 生活?读书?新知三联书店, 1999.
[10]  倪梁康. 思考“自我”的两种方式——对胡塞尔1920年前后所撰三篇文字的重新解读[J]. 中山大学学报(社会科学版), 2009, 49(5): 1-10.

Full-Text

Contact Us

[email protected]

QQ:3279437679

WhatsApp +8615387084133