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业绩股权激励制度下职业经理人激励和绩效脱钩问题研究
Research on the Decoupling of Professional Managers’ Incentive and Performance under the Performance Equity Incentive System

DOI: 10.12677/MM.2024.143048, PP. 390-396

Keywords: 职业经理人,股权激励制度,企业绩效
Professional Managers
, Equity Incentive System, Corporate Performance

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Abstract:

建立完善的激励机制是解决委托代理问题的核心,股权激励作为主要激励方式之一,对企业的发展有重要的影响。解决股权激励制度下存在的相关问题是提高企业效益的重要途径。本文综合利用经济学、管理学、会计学的研究成果,结合职业经理人股权激励制度,分析存在的激励和企业绩效脱钩问题,并提出相应的完善方案。本文认为,以健全国家职业经理人市场为根本,利用内外部动机激励和约束制度,完善绩效评估管理系统,是解决激励与绩效脱钩问题,促进企业和职业经理人共同发展的有效途径。希望本文的探讨能够为企业完善股权激励制度,解决激励和绩效脱钩问题提供借鉴。
Establishing a sound incentive mechanism is the core of solving the principal-agent problem. As one of the main incentive methods, equity incentive has an important impact on the development of enterprises. Solving the related problems under the equity incentive system is an important way to improve the efficiency of enterprises. Based on the research results of economics, management and accounting, combined with the equity incentive system of professional managers, this paper analyzes the existing problems of decoupling between incentive and enterprise performance, and puts forward corresponding improvement schemes. This paper argues that it is an effective way to solve the problem of decoupling between incentive and performance and promote the common development of enterprises and professional managers by improving the national professional manager market, using the internal and external motivation incentive and restraint system, and improving the performance evaluation management system. It is hoped that the discussion in this paper can provide reference for enterprises to improve the equity incentive system and solve the problem of incentive and performance decoupling.

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