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国有企业内部控制质量对非投资效率的影响研究
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Abstract:
投资是宏观经济发展的引擎。高效率的投资使企业在激烈的市场竞争环境下立于不败之地。但我国国有企业投资质量的现状却不尽如人意。公司治理过程中的代理问题和信息不对称均在一定程度上降低了投资的效率和效果，而内部控制能够有效改善这两类问题。研究选取A股2012~2021年国有上市公司为样本，探究实施内部控制对国企非投资效率的影响。研究发现，对国有企业而言，内部控制质量与其非效率投资呈负相关关系；且高水平的内部控制质量对过度投资和投资不足都能起到明显的抑制作用。进一步研究发现，相比于地方国企，中央国企中高质量内部控制抑制过度投资效果更显著。研究从公司治理角度出发，丰富了影响国企投资行为因素的研究，也从实践中为国有企业加强内部控制建设提供经验参考。
Investment is the engine of macroeconomic development. Efficient investment enables enterprises to stand invincible in a fiercely competitive market environment. However, the current situation of investment quality in state-owned enterprises in our country is not satisfactory. The agency problems and information asymmetry in the process of corporate governance have to some extent reduced the efficiency and effectiveness of investment, while internal control can effectively improve these two types of problems. The study selected A-share state-owned listed companies from 2012 to 2021 as samples to explore the impact of implementing internal control on the non investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises. Research has found that for state-owned enterprises, there is a negative correlation between internal control quality and inefficient investment; And high-level internal control quality can have a significant inhibitory effect on both overinvestment and underinvestment. Further research has found that compared to local state-owned enterprises, high-quality internal controls in central state-owned enterprises have a more significant inhibitory effect on excessive investment. The study, starting from the perspective of corporate governance, enriches the research on the factors affecting the investment behavior of state-owned enterprises, and provides practical experience and reference for strengthening internal control construction in state-owned enterprises.
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