[1] | “Export 2020 EXIM Annual Report”. EXIM Bank. https://www.exim.gov>reports>annual>2020
|
[2] | Alekseenkova, E. (2017). Comparative Analysis of the “5 + 1” Formats Created in Central Asia (with the Participation of the United States, South Korea, Japan and the EU). https://cyberleninka.ru>article
|
[3] | Cohen, A., & Grant, J. (2020). Soft Infrastructure Development in Central Asia 2020: Effective Infrastructure Development through Legislation, Regulation, Policies, Governance, and Public Private Frameworks. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org
|
[4] | Cooley, A., & Heathershaw, J. (2019). A Response: The Transnational “High Politics” of Central Asia’s Elites and Opposition. Post-Communist Economies, 31, 559-561. https://doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2018.1545948
|
[5] | Dunn, J. (2009). Rethinking American Strategy in Central Asia (20 p.). DTIC. https://apps.dtic.mil>ASIA https://www.usafa.edu>app>uploads>06_RET https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com
|
[6] | FMPRC China (2022). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn
|
[7] | Graham, T. (2018). Central Asian Countries Want to Have USA. https://qazaqtimes.com
|
[8] | Kayani, S. A. (2022). US Engagement with Central Asia (1991-2021). Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, 7, 31-40. https://doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2022(VII-II).05
|
[9] | KZ.USEmbassy.gov. (2022). United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025. https://kz.usembassy.gov>u-s-strategy-for-central-asia
|
[10] | Laruelle, M. (2013). The Afghanistan-Central Asia Relationship. https://www.files.ethz.ch>isn>EUCAM_WP13
|
[11] | Laruelle, M. (2018). Central Asia in the Era of Sovereignty. The Return of Tamerlane? Chapter “Kazakhstan’s Dilemma on Eurasian and Central Asian Integrations”.
|
[12] | National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2023). https://www.nationalbank.kz/ru
|
[13] | OPIC (2021). OIG Oversight: Overseas Private Investment Corporation. https://www.oig.usaid.gov>OPIC
|
[14] | Roy, A., & Jonson, L. (2001). Central Asian Security: The New International Context Paperback.
|
[15] | Rumer, E., Sokolsky, R., & Stronsky, P. (2016). U.S. Policy toward Central Asia 3.0. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/25/u.s.-policy-toward-central-asia-3.0-pub-62556
|
[16] | Sanchez, W. A. (2021). No U.S. President Has Ever Visited Central Asia.
|
[17] | Starr (2005). A Greater Central Asia Partnership for Afghanistan and Its Neighbors. Silk Road Paper, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. https://www.silkroadstudies.org>SilkRoadPapers
|
[18] | Starr (2017). The New Central Asia Nexus. American Interest, 12, 62-69.
|
[19] | State.Gov. (2023). 2023 Investment Climate Statements: Kazakhstan. U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov>reports>Kazakhstan
|
[20] | The American Interest (2015). U.S. Strategy towards Afghanistan and (the Rest of) Central Asia. https://www.the-american-interest.com/.../u-s-strategy-toward
|
[21] | The Atlantic Council (2019). Silk Road 2.0: US Strategy toward China’s Belt and Road.
|
[22] | The Diplomat (2016). US Secretary of State to Visit All Five Central Asian States. https://thediplomat.com/2015/.../us-secretary-of-state-to-visit
|
[23] | The Diplomat (2018). The Trans-Caspian Corridor: Kazakhstan’s Silk Road. https://thediplomat.com>the-t
|
[24] | Tolipov, F. (2015). Pluses and Minuses of the C5+1 Format. The CACI Analyst. https://www.cacianalyst.org
|
[25] | U.S. Department of State (2020). United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025. https://www.state.gov>united
|
[26] | USAID (2020). Congressional Budget Justification. USAID. https://www.usaid.gov>files>FY-2020-CBJ-State-and-USAID-Appendix-2
|
[27] | Whitehouse (2015). Joint Declaration of Partnership and Cooperation by the Five Countries of Central Asia and the United States of America. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/11/249050.htm
|
[28] | Whitehouse (2019). United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025. Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Strategy for a New Era. Whitehouse. A New National Security. https://www.whitehouse.gov/
|
[29] | World Bank (2022). Another Export Route Is Used—The Atyrau-Samara Oil Pipeline; Atasu-Alashankou Oil Pipeline. http://wrld.bg/SRTD50E7xyn
|
[30] | Zhou, L. (2021). US Moves to Boost Military Presence in Indo-Pacific amid China Threat. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3125277/us-moves-boost-military-presence-indo-pacific-amid-china#:Beijing
|
[31] | Zimmerman, T. (2015). The New Silk Roads: China, the US, and the Future of Central Asia (pp. 1-26). Center on International Cooperation.
|