Desempleo, transferencias monetarias y condicionalidad: Un análisis en la ciudad de Rosario, Argentina

since the mid 1990s, in some latin american countries, a number of regulatory policies for unemployment have been developed that incorporate central arguments from the anglo-saxon term workfare. one element this scheme introduces is the obligation of beneficiaries to repay or give compensation for the subsidy received. this article proposes to analyze the specific way that the notion of social reciprocity takes shape in implementing the greatest argentinean regulatory program for unemployment, the ？unemployed head of household？ program, in the city of rosario. the problem is approached through four central themes: places where the compensatory activities foreseen in the program？s regulations are carried out; the number of beneficiaries who effectively carry out such activities; the number of hours invested in these activities; and the type of activities carried out. methodology combines the use of secondary information from official records with the use of primary information from the study？s own time use surveys.