Consciousness and the introspection of 'qualitative simples'

philosophers have long been familiar with the contrast between predicates or concepts that denote "qualitative simples," as opposed to predicates or concepts that denote or express "structural, relational, causal, or functional" features. the tendency has been to think of these two classes of properties as being ontologically quite different from each other. some would insist that the features displayed in this private cognitive domain are the only genuinely simple qualitative features, on grounds that their external brethren all turn out to admit of a structural, relational, causal, or functional analysis of some kind after all. in this paper i wish to take a more general and more philosophical approach to the anti-reductionist arguments which run into trouble with the philosophy of science, with emerging neuroscience, and with the history of science generally. they lack integrity even by the standards of purely analytic philosophy.