El argumento de sustracción para universales trascendentes

this work presents the subtraction argument for transcendent universals, i.e., for universals that are not instantiated. the argument depends on two main premises: (i) the contingency of the different instantiations of a universal, and (ii) the ontological independence between these instantiations. by the first premise one can postulate metaphysically possible worlds where given instantiations of a universal are subtracted. one can consider, then, a possible world where only one object instantiates a universal. by the principle (ii) of independence, construed in a particular way, one can postulate in this point a possible world where no object instantiates the universal. it is contended that the independence thesis (ii) is too strong for the defender of immanent universal, who can construe it in a milder guise, compatible with the generic dependence of universals to having some or other instance.