Models, truth and realism: assessing Bas van Fraassen's views on scientific representation

this paper is devoted to an analysis of some aspects of bas van fraassen's views on representation. while i agree with most of his claims, i disagree on the following three issues. firstly, i contend that some isomorphism (or at least homomorphism) between the representor and what is represented is a universal necessary condition for the success of any representation, even in the case of misrepresentation. secondly, i argue that the so-called "semantic" or "model-theoretic" construal of theories does not give proper due to the role played by true propositions in successful representing practices. thirdly, i attempt to show that the force of van fraassen's pragmatic - and antirealist - "dissolution" of the "loss of reality objection" loses its bite when we realize that our cognitive contact with real phenomena is achieved not by representing but by expressing true propositions about them.