Disociaciones cognoscitivas y la evolucionabilidad de la mente

in the cognitive sciences, there is a theory concerning the computational architecture of the mind known as massive modularity. this theory holds that the mind is constituted mostly by cognitive modules. some of the defenders of this theory have put forward an argument whose conclusion is that it is very likely that those mechanisms that are cognitively very modular are more evolvable than mechanisms that are not cognitively modular (or that are modular to a lesser degree). here i show that a plausible defense of this conclusion requires us to add to the usual notion of cognitive modularity the following characteristic: "a cognitive system s of organism of a population p is cognitively modular only if s is variationally modular in p." i also defend the view that one of the characteristics normally associated to the concept of cognitive modularity-namely, the notion of a double dissociation-is conceptually close to the concept of variational modularity. additionally, i argue that there are not positive reasons-while there are some negative ones-to think that the other characteristics usually associated to cognitive modularity, such as domain specificity or functional specialization, enhance the evolvability of cognitive modules.