Testeo, privacidad, y el argumento del lenguaje privado

this paper contains three different kinds of objections to wittgenstein's famous "private language argument". first i offer a possible reconstruction of the argument. then, as a first objection, drawing my ideas from h.n casta？eda, i present cases where, against wittgenstein's opinion, the subject corrects his own errors based on different subjective criteria (coherence, the preservation of regularities, the preservation of logical inferences, etc). afterwards, as a second objection, i offer hypothetical examples in order to show that subjective experiences, even is they were private, could in principle be intersubjectively tested, although in a indirect way, as the unobservable entities of science are. finally, as a third point, i challenge a basic presupposition of cartesianism on which the private language argument rests. this presupposition is the well known thesis of the essential privacy of subjective experience. my argument against this thesis is based on the split-brain cases, studied by t. nagel, m. lockwood and others.