Pragmatismo, empirismo y representaciones: Una propuesta acerca del papel epistémico de la experiencia

empiricism can be characterized, on the one hand, as a theory about the sources of empirical knowledge; on the other hand, as an epistemic outlook about justification of empirical beliefs. this last dimension of empiricism has been criticized by many philosophers nowadays. paradigmatically, rorty has said that experience is only the cause of beliefs, but not its justification. rorty's thesis is that beliefs relate to the world only causally. this paper has two parts. in the first it is argued, against rorty, that experience must be an epistemic instance of justification if beliefs are to have any objective content at all. in the second, it is proposed an alternative pragmatist conception of knowledge which i) attributes an epistemic role to experience without falling into "the myth of the given" and ii) reintroduces the concept of "representation" without compromising with representationalism.