The veto power of sub-national governments in Brazil: political institutions and parliamentary behaviour in the post-1988 period

the article analyses the veto power of territorial governments in brazil, by examining the parliamentary behaviour of state caucuses (bancadas) as well as their institutional veto opportunities when it comes to matters related to sub-national governments？ revenues and decision-making authority over their own taxes, policy responsibilities and expenditures. the " imposition of losses" upon territorial governments characterized legislative production during the 1989-2006 period, even though these decisions were intensely negotiated. the article concludes that the decision-making centralization at the central arenas, the absence of additional veto arenas and the ease with which constitutional amendments may be approved characterize decision-making on federal issues in brazil. furthermore, state caucuses (bancadas) do not act as collective players, since they vote divided along party lines. these institutional factors limit the veto power of territorial governments in brazil.