PERSONA Y MáSCARA

the article defends the pertinency and the value of the terminus "person" because of the significant richness acquired through the history of the philosophy, that lets, as none other concept, define the human being. four moments of the history can be distinguished due to the way in which they recreate its meaning: in the greek philosophy, "person" is linked to the role of the human being in the society and to the function that he performs; in it the sense of individuality is not outstanding. in the medieval philosophy the assumption of the connotation of individuality is initiated, specially through the development of the concepts individuation and personality; these two words answer to the individual's feature of "belonging to" a species, being different to the others. in the modern philosophy, the concept of individual is developed, using it in an abstract way as principle of laws; it acquires an universal tone, as a feature of every man as an equal being before the law and rights subject. the concept of "person" is taken by locke to refer to the personal identity, that is the characteristic of human beings of being thinker individuals, reflexive, with conscience of themselves and with will. finally, wittgenstein, from the reflection about the interpretation of the rostrum (of all symbols and of an artwork) recognizes, without thematizing them explicitly, the individuality traits, sociability and universality of the human being, which are supposed in the way to stablish relation with a person's face. the historical study of the concept and its synthesis in the contemporary philosophy are given as two arguments that let us defend the pertinence of the terminus for philosophy and for important purriews of the practical life. the research about the person developed by ricoeur as from the analysis and interpretation of a speech act, lets him study the man as subject of the enunciation in a communicative action; in the subject of the enunciation, the three spheres of t