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财贸经济  2014 

银行高管薪酬与系统性风险——基于中国上市银行(2007-2013)的实证研究

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Keywords: 高管薪酬,商业银行,系统性风险

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Abstract:

不恰当的薪酬激励被公认为金融危机爆发的深层根源之一,优化薪酬结构则是针对性监管政策的关键举措。基于东西方银行薪酬机制差异,本文将银行高管薪酬分解为权力薪酬、激励薪酬及操作薪酬,以2007-2013年上市银行为样本,研究我国银行高管薪酬结构与系统性风险之间的关联。研究发现,银行高管的激励薪酬与系统性风险显著正相关,其传导渠道为期限错配。据此,调整银行高管薪酬结构、强化银行公司治理,应成为纠正不恰当薪酬机制的当务之急。

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