管理层权力与认知偏差对企业衍生品投机行为的推动：替代还是互补？——来自中国上市公司的证据
Managerial Power, Cognition Biases and Speculation in Application of Derivatives：Replacement or Complement？——Evidence from China's Listed Companies

以我国2008-2015年度应用过衍生品的沪深A股上市公司数据为研究样本，考察管理层特征（管理层权力和认知偏差）与企业衍生品投机行为的相关性以及二者之间的交互关系，研究发现：在全样本与快速增长组中，管理层权力与认知偏差均与企业衍生品投机行为显著正相关；在非快速增长组中，管理层权力的作用显著，而认知偏差不显著；在全样本与非快速增长组中，认知偏差与管理层权力之间存在相互替代的作用关系，而在快速增长组中，两者之间的关系体现为相互加强，即互补关系。
Based on a sample of China's listed companies (2008-2015) which have applied derivatives to test the relevance between speculation and management characteristics represented by managerial power and cognition biases, especially the reciprocity of the two drives, it can be found that: for the whole sample and quicker growth sample, managerial power and cognition biases might lead to speculation by derivatives; for the slower growth sample, managerial power is significant while cognition biases not; there might be replacement between managerial power and cognition biases for the whole sample and slower growth sample, while complement for the quicker growth sample.