基于微分博弈的食品供应链溯源信息共享行为协调机制研究
Study on Coordination Mechanism of Traceable Information Sharing Behavior in Food Supply Chain Based on Differential Game

运用微分博弈的方法，构建追溯食品生产商和追溯食品加工商的博弈模型，研究3种不同决策模式下二者溯源信息共享的最优策略、收益及食品供应链总收益的变化情况，并利用Matlab对模型进行仿真模拟分析。结果表明：集中决策时食品供应链的总收益最大；成本分担契约可以实现追溯食品生产商和食品供应链收益的帕累托改进；溯源食品品牌形象及溯源信息共享成本的影响系数对追溯食品生产商和追溯食品加工商的溯源信息共享行为产生影响。
Based on differential game,this paper constructs the game model of traceable food manufacturers and traceable food processors and studies the optimal traceable information sharing strategy of traceable food manufacturers and traceable food processors,revenue and the total revenue of the entire food supply chain under three different decision-making conditions. Then simulation model is analyzed with the help of Matlab in this paper. The result shows that the total revenues of the entire food supply chain are the largest when making centralized decision. Making cost sharing can achieve a Pareto improvement for the traceable food manufacturers and the total revenue of the entire food supply chain. The influencing coefficient of brand image and traceable information sharing cost have the impact on both traceable food manufacturers and traceable food processors.