Una defensa de la metainducción pesimista

in this paper, i shall offer a defense of laudan's 'metainductive' argument (1981) against convergent epistemological realism (hereafter rec). to this end, i shall analyze two lines of attack that have been directed against the metainductive argument: the first one, offered by antonio dieguez (1998), charges laudan with adding illegitimately a set of hidden premises to the realist arguments, which are not maintained, neither implicitly nor explicitly, by advocates of realism. the second line of attack, directed by stathis psillos (1999), tries to reduce the number of counterexamples offered by laudan to show that the inductive basis of his argument is not broad enough, nor sufficiently representative to guarantee pessimistic induction. additionally, psillos tries to show that there are serious doubts about laudan's theories belonging to a developmental stage mature enough or that they have been successful. to answer the first attack, i shall make a contrast between the assumptions attributed by laudan to the realist, and those that dieguez thinks are illegitimately attributed by laudan to rec. regarding psillos' attacks, i shall show that much of his argumentative line has been anticipated by laudan, who answers successfully such attack. for this reason, an attempt at reducing the list, indicating that most of the theories mentioned in the argument do not belong to mature stages of science's development does not seem persuasive, because -as indicated by laudan- such a strategy would fail, given that the realist would have to admit that he does not have an explanation of the success of science, regardless of the stage in which theories are.